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Abstract:  Livestock production in arid and semi-arid rangelands is a risky enterprise. Covariate 
risk of catastrophic livestock loss due to drought is the most critical uninsured risk facing 
livestock producers.  These losses can lead to persistent poverty. We are trying to design an 
index based livestock insurance (IBLI) program as a viable means to help pastoralists in northern 
Kenya manage such covariate risk of livestock losses due to drought. A predicted livestock 
mortality index – established from a statistical relationship between satellite-generated 
vegetation imagery and historical records of community level livestock losses – represents an 
objectively, cost effectively measured and non-human manipulable index that triggers insurance 
payout. The insurance is offered by private insurance companies. The advantages of reduced 
transaction costs and asymmetric information problems, however, come at the cost of increased 
basis risk, which refers to the imperfect correlation between an insured‟s loss experience and the 
index. We have developed a game that explains to pastoralists how such an insurance product 
could work. We built in the game both covariate and idiosyncratic shocks, and use a subsistence 
constraint to generate bifurcating asset dynamics, observed empirically in the targeted 
communities. This paper describes how the game was designed, how it was used in the field, and 
presents findings on how individuals played the game. The paper concludes by discussing how 
these findings are being used in the design and broader extension of the index based insurance 
product. 
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Introduction: 
 Surviving from livestock and livestock products in the arid and semi arid rangelands of 
the developing world is a risky way to earn a living.  However, it is often the most economically 
viable use of these dry areas (Homewood 2008, Ellis and Swift 1995, Westoby et al. 1993, 
Behnke et al. 1993) and the pastoral societies who live in these areas have developed a variety of 
strategies to both manage risk exposure ex ante as well as risk coping strategies that can be 
adopted ex post (Morton 2006, Bollig 2005, McCabe 2004, McPeak and Barrett 2001).  Because 
covariate risk of livestock loss due to drought still represents the key uninsured risk that 
conditions pastoralists‟ livestock accumulation, our project aims to investigate the possibility that 
a market viable index based livestock insurance can be added as a risk management tool for 
pastoral producers in arid and semi arid rangelands, which could as well complement to the 
broader poverty reduction program in these areas. 
 The pastoral production system is frequently described as having a „boom and bust‟ 
pattern in herd sizes over time (Scoones 1993).  Slow steady herd growth over a number of years 
is reversed in sudden widespread die offs.  Pastoralists have utilized herd mobility, livestock 
loaning practices, herd accumulation, species diversification, marketing, and a variety of other 
means to reduce the size of losses in these „bust‟ phases and increase the rapidity of the recovery 
in the ensuing „boom‟ period.  However, the evidence suggests that these shocks not only lead to 
human suffering during and following the loss of livestock, but they also impact decisions that 
livestock owners make in „boom‟ periods that lead to lower income streams than might be 
realized in the absence of this looming risk.  As there is currently little prospect that the 
underlying production risk can be reduced through new production technologies in a cost 
effective manner (such as irrigated fodder production, introduction of new breeds, or pasture 
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seeding), an alternative is to introduce financial instruments that allow people a way to manage 
the risk.   This paper discusses how we have gone about introducing index based livestock 
insurance (IBLI) as a formal sector financial tool that can potentially be added into livestock 
producers‟ risk management strategy in Marsabit District of northern Kenya.   
Pastoralist Production: 
Northern Kenya is characterized by bimodal rainfall, with two rainy seasons interrupted 
by two dry seasons with each season lasting roughly three months. Pastoralists raise livestock in 
lowlands of northern Kenya, and some rain fed cultivation is possible in the highlands of this 
area.  Mean annual lowland rainfall can be as low as 150 mm while in the highlands it can go up 
to 800 mm.   All but one of the sites we played the game (Dirib Gumbo is the exception) are in 
the lowlands.  Rainfall is highly variable both spatially and temporally, and herders rely on 
mobility as a means of coping with variability in pasture conditions.  Most land is communally 
held, and pasture growth is triggered by rainfall. 
A sense of the variability in pasture conditions over time can be seen in Figure 1. 
Normalized Differential Vegetation Index (NDVI) measures – an indicator of vegetative cover 
widely used in drought monitoring programs in Africa – are drawn from an approximately 30km 
by 30 km area (a geographic boundary that covers key migratory routes) around North Horr and 
Kargi communities in northern Kenya. They are then standardized using long-term (1982-2008) 
mean and standard deviation
4
 to represent deviations of NDVI from normal condition. Major 
livestock losses in these areas were clearly noted in 1984, 1991-2, 1994, 1996, 2000, and 2005-6.  
Late 1997 / early 1998 was the El Nino event that led to flooding in this area. 
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 Chantarat et al. 2009a provides detailed derivations of NDVI, standardized NDVI and other constructed NDVI 
variables necessary for constructing predicted livestock mortality index.  
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[Insert figure 1 about here] 
 
The PARIMA (Pastoralist Risk Management) Project was active in northern Kenya and 
southern Ethiopia from 1998 to 2009.  Many on the IBLI team also worked with PARIMA.  
Extensive data was gathered from random samples in eleven communities. Four of them (Dirib 
Gumbo, Kargi, Logologo, and North Horr) are in Marsabit district. From the PARIMA data, we 
can derive some background information on pastoral production in Marsabit district. First, we 
can see the profile of total income from data collected quarterly from June 2000 to June 2002, 
where all home produced and consumed commodities are valued at their market prices.   
[insert table 1 about here] 
Almost all of the milk is home produced and consumed. This indicates that livestock and 
livestock products contribute the majority of income (58%). While there is a significant 
contribution from non – livestock sources, livestock and livestock products clearly serve as the 
foundation for the economy in this region.  
 Vulnerability to livestock loss is also evident in the data from these sites. Figure 2 reports 
mean and median herd size for the Marsabit sites over time. This is measured in Tropical 
Livestock Units (TLUs)
5
. Though not all sites were identically impacted, there is a pattern that 
livestock losses occurred in mid to late 2000, followed by a slow recovery.  From our continued 
work in the area, we can report that this recovery continued until 2005, when losses were again 
experienced.  
[Insert figure 2 about here] 
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 1 TLU is the equivalent of 250 kilogram liveweight of an animal.  1 TLU = 0.7 camels = 1 head of cattle = 10 
sheep = 11 goats using the weights in the Range Management Handbook for Kenya‟s report on Marsabit District 
(Schwartz et al. 1991). 
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Figure 3 represents the number of livestock deaths reported per survey round in the four 
Marsabit sites, and breaks down these deaths into categories corresponding to the reasons for the 
death cited by the owner. It illustrates that there was a major covariate shock in the first three 
periods driving mortality, and that mortality occurs at a lower frequency and from different 
causes following the opening rounds that were characterized by widespread drought loss.  This 
corresponds to the idea of there being both a covariate and an idiosyncratic component to herd 
mortality. 
[insert figure 3 around here] 
One other finding of relevance to the design of the insurance game is the idea of asset 
thresholds and bifurcating asset dynamics.  Studies of long term poverty dynamics have 
increasingly identified the possibility that there are multiple stable states in asset space, so that 
assets above the threshold lead one toward a „good‟ outcome, and below the threshold one moves 
towards a „poverty trap‟ outcome (Carter and Barrett 2006, Zimmerman and Carter 2003).  This 
issue has been explicitly studied for pastoral areas by Barrett et al. (2006) Lybbert et al. (2004) 
and McPeak and Barrett (2001).  Previous research suggests there is a herd size threshold in the 
10-15 livestock unit range, above which one is likely to be able to recover from a „bust‟ and 
below which one is in danger of eventually losing the herd completely.   We wanted to design 
our game so that there was a mechanism to allow for bifurcating asset dynamics. 
In summary, the information in this section conveys four main messages.  One, livestock 
and livestock products are critical for the generation of income. Two, livestock wealth is 
vulnerable to shocks.  Three, there is both a covariate and an idiosyncratic component to 
livestock mortality.  Four, the loss of livestock can have long term implications for a households 
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well being.  We now briefly explain how index based insurance works before turning to the issue 
of how we went about explaining how it worked to herders in northern Kenya. 
Index based Livestock Insurance 
Index based livestock insurance (IBLI) is a financial tool that has the potential to be used 
in managing the risk of asset loss (Carter et al. 2009, Chantarat et al. 2009a, Barrett et al. 2008, 
Mude et al. 2008, Barnett and Mahul 2007, Mahul and Skees 2005).  In the case of northern 
Kenya, IBLI triggers insurance payout at the end of the coverage season (long rain – long dry or 
short rain – short dry seasons) based on a well defined predicted livestock mortality index, which 
is  established from a strong predictive relationship between historical data on household 
livestock mortality recorded monthly over 2000-2008 by the World Bank funded Arid Lands 
Research Management Project (ALRMP) and various constructed NDVI variables (Chantarat et 
al. 2009a). 
Insurance contracts are written with a trigger strike point of predicted livestock mortality 
rate (%), above which insurance payout will be made to the insured. Herders can buy insurance 
on a „livestock unit‟ which is the cash value of a head of cattle. They buy this at the start of a 
season. And so if NDVI-based predicted livestock mortality index exceeds the pre-specified 
strike point, insurance payout will be made to compensate for the incremental loss (%) beyond 
this strike for total insured livestock units of the herder, who bought insurance at the start of the 
season. 
Clearly, herders bear some of the risk of livestock losses, both in terms of a share of the 
estimated losses due to the covariate shock (below the pre-specified strike point) as well as any 
basis risk associated with idiosyncratic losses that are not explained by the index.  No attempt is 
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made to assess losses to individual herders or adjust payouts to reflect individual realizations.  
Livestock losses are compensated based purely on the covariate signal captured by the NDVI-
based predicted livestock mortality index. An important message we hope to convey to people 
who play the game is that no idiosyncratic shocks or idiosyncratic deviations from what is 
predicted to be the covariate shock are covered by the insurance product. 
Defining parameters for the game: 
 In early 2008, we began discussions of the use of games in our project to accomplish two 
objectives.  The first was as an extension tool, designed to illustrate the basic idea of what IBLI 
does and does not do.  Since the model of this project is to work with the private sector insurance 
companies to offer insurance that livestock owners will buy, it is critical that potential consumers 
be aware of how insurance works.  This motivated our extension effort.  The second objective 
was to generate some insight into how people might respond to the presence of livestock 
insurance.  This would help us think through targeting, marketing, and possible contract design 
issues and also allow us to report back to the insurance companies what kind of response they 
might find when this product becomes commercially available.  This motivated the current and 
related studies conducted by team members (Lybbert et al. 2009 , Carter et al. 2009) 
 As one goal of this paper is documenting how we went about explaining index insurance, 
this section describes how the work was conducted.  In May 2008, three team members met in 
Nairobi to discuss the game and we began formulating a plan to be ready to conduct the game in 
the field by August 2008.  In early July, we calculated herd growth, drought frequency, and 
drought severity parameters based on the PARIMA data, ALRMP (Arid Lands Resource 
Management Project) data, IPAL (Integrated Project on Arid Lands) data, and other sources on 
livestock production in the area (Torry 1973; O‟Leary 1985;  Robinson 1984; Schwartz et al. 
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1991).  In mid July, a team meeting was held in Ithaca to talk through the design of the game, 
and this discussion continued though the final weeks of July in Nairobi.   
We were developing two variants of the game at this point.  Both were being used to 
generate bifurcating asset dynamics, and were based on two theories about what could generate 
the outcome found in earlier empirical studies described above.  One variant was based on the 
hypothesis that the dynamics were generated by a subsistence constraint.  To represent this we 
made herd growth common across herders, but added in a constant subsistence constraint that 
had to be met in each round by all players.  The second variant was based on the hypothesis that 
those with larger herds were able to have the herds grow faster due to their greater ability to 
access higher quality pasture through migration.  To capture this we made herd growth rates a 
function of current period herd size.  We could devise a way to implement this in the game in a 
way that had some plausibility by using the story that higher herd sizes corresponded to higher 
milk production, so that consumption in the form of offtake from the herd declined as herd size 
increased.   We experimented with using different parameter values and random number 
generators to investigate the long term dynamics of the different specifications we were 
considering.  After much discussion and simulation, the fixed consumption specification was 
selected as it was easier to explain and easily generated the desired bifurcating asset dynamics 
we wished to illustrate.
6
 Expected herd growth in this specification is 7.5% prior to offtake to 
meet consumption needs.  As consumption was fixed regardless of herd size, the expected 
growth rate reflecting consumption is 0.075-(0.5/herd size).
7
  This leads to the following graph 
                                                 
6
 While it remains an open empirical question which hypothesis is best supported by the data, as a team we tend to 
think the growth rate conditional on herd size due to differences in more likely.  Unfortunately it was harder to 
develop this into a simple game. 
 
7
 Consumption was defined to be 0.5 TLU per six month season as that was an easy to implement approximation of 
reality as will be discussed below. 
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of expected growth rate conditional on herd size (asymptotically approaching 7.5%, crossing 
zero at 6 2/3rds TLU) 
[insert figure 4 about here] 
Testing the game 
 
In late July 2008, three members of the team who were to implement the game and are 
the authors of this paper spent the day in Marsabit playing the game with each other and 
modifying it to be simpler.  For example, we modified the probability distribution of the seasons 
and the magnitude of herd growth associated with these probabilities to make the game have 
fewer potential seasonal outcomes but with the same mean, we experimented with alternative 
starting herd sizes and reduced them from four starting values to three (6TLU, 8TLU, and 
10TLU), we decided only integer values of herd sizes could be insured and went with a 1% 
premium among other „about to go in the field‟ modifications.  The three herd sizes were chosen 
to be realistic in terms of peoples‟ experiences (see figure one for the median herd size) and to 
straddle the expected herd growth threshold.  Our goal was to ensure the game was easy to 
understand while still conveying the core messages.  By the end of the day, we have gotten to a 
point we felt the game was ready to go forward with testing using the enumerators.  We worked 
up some flip chart posters overnight to explain some of the key elements of the game and also 
came up with the happy face / average face / sad face bottle cap representation of the 
idiosyncratic luck described below.  
Training the enumerators. 
Over a two day period we trained the enumerators in how the game worked.   Much of it 
was based on two of our team playing the game in front of the enumerators with the third writing 
the results up on flip chart paper and running the game.  We showed a basic game with differing 
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initial herd sizes and common shocks.  We then showed how it worked with idiosyncratic 
shocks.  Finally we discussed with them how insurance worked. At the end of the training we ran 
all the enumerators through a full game as players so they could see how it worked and also for 
us to troubleshoot any problems that arose.  Lots of math problems were encountered, but slowly 
enumerators got the language down and the idea down.  At first, we just stressed the herd 
dynamics, difference between covariate and idiosyncratic risk, and consumption requirement.  
We then added in insurance and had enumerators play a few rounds with it to show them how it 
was represented in the context of the game.  We spent some time stressing how the fact that an 
idiosyncratic shock was not compensated could be used to illustrate what kinds of losses 
insurance could not help with.  By the end of the day, they seemed to grasp what we were after.  
We developed a form to use to record the play of participants that was designed to minimize 
enumerator errors as much as possible.  We quickly photocopied a set of these to be used the 
next and following days in the villages. 
How a ‘game day’ was structured. 
The basic pattern of the game was repeated two consecutive days in each community and 
five communities were visited so there were ten total „showings‟ in all.  Start time varied by site.  
We arrived at a central point in the village that had been arranged as the meeting point ahead of 
time between 8:30 and 10:00 and spent some time tracking down people that took a variable 
amount of time.  When we did start, we first thanked them for coming and went ahead with oral 
consent procedures.  In some cases a prayer was offered by the participants to start the meeting.  
We then spent some time introducing the game and the idea of index based insurance.  We 
described how the PARIMA work, the ALRMP work, our parallel willingness to pay studies 
(Chantarat et al. 2009b), and the work we were doing today would be combined to generate the 
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details of the real insurance we hoped to offer in the coming year. We noted that this was the first 
visit, but there would be more. Also, we stressed that insurance would be for whoever wanted to 
buy it when we really offered it, not just the people here today. There had been some confusion 
about this in the sites that we wanted to clear up.   
We noted in the introduction that there were two main goals of our work in the village 
that day.  First, we were still trying to design this insurance that we hope to have commercially 
available to them in the future.  We wanted to use the evidence we gathered in the game play to 
come up with the best design possible.  Second, insurance is a new idea.  We told them that if we 
are going to offer people the opportunity to buy insurance, they have to understand how it works, 
and what it does and does not cover.  We explained the basic concept behind insurance was to 
take money when times were good and return it when times were bad.   We stressed that this was 
index insurance that would be based on the season but not tied to a particular animal,  as there 
was no way the insurance company would be coming out to their satellite camps to check on 
their personal losses. 
We then moved on to show participants NDVI data based graphs and tried to explain how 
these would be used by the actual insurance game. We had created a seasonal graph for a 30 
kilometer radius around each of the sites before coming to the villages. We identified which were 
the high points and which were the low points so they could see how the patterns in the NDVI 
based graphs matched their memories of conditions on the ground. We talked some about the 
moving stars that they had seen at night being satellites taking pictures and how that could be 
used by this insurance product. 
We then moved on to an explanation of the game. We showed them the chips, explaining 
that a white chip was a head of cattle, a red one a goat and a green one a sheep.  In our game 
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goats and sheep were the same value, and 10 of them equaled on head of cattle.  We told them 
they could think of it in terms of exchange like the terms by which people in their villages trade 
livestock with each other outside of market exchange, and they said the rates were about right 
given their practices.  In the camel raising sites we also said for our purposes, one head of cattle 
and four goats equaled one camel (1.4 TLU). We then explained that each season was six months 
long, and started with a rainy season followed by a dry season.  We used the local terms to 
describe the rainy season – dry season pairs.   
We talked about the need to sell livestock in each period to generate income for 
consumption goods, which from previous survey work averaged slightly less than one goat sale a 
month.  For ease of transactions, we fixed consumption at 5 goats or sheep at the start of each 
six-month season.  This was usually translated by enumerators and participants as some variant 
of „food for the kids‟.   
We then showed them the ping pong balls and explained their meanings.  There were 16 
ping pong balls in a plastic bag.  Each type of ball was explained in local language terms that are 
commonly used to describe kinds of seasons.  There were five +20% balls with a crossing pattern 
drawn on them.  These were said to be a really good season.  For each head of cattle you had, 
two goats or sheep were born.  Alternatively, if you had ten head of cattle, two more were added.  
This was described and illustrated by laying out chips to add to a herd.  We then looked at the 
seven +10 % balls. This was a good season.  This was the most likely kind of year, and for every 
one head of cattle you had, one goat or sheep was born.  We did the laying out of chips for this 
again too.  Two balls were all blue.  These were zero growth balls, where none were added or 
taken away by the season.  This was a bad year, but not a drought.  Then there were two final 
balls.  One, half covered in red, was a season where 20% was lost.  We showed them again with 
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chips how such a season would work.  Then we showed them the final ball all covered in red, a 
very bad drought where 30% was lost.  We illustrated with chips how this kind of season would 
work.   
As noted above, expected growth is 7.5% with these values and when consumption is 
factored in, there is a herd size threshold at 6 2/3rds TLU that determines whether expected herd 
growth with consumption factored in is positive or negative (though we did not stress this in the 
description of the game to players, preferring to see if they could identify the larger pattern 
through playing the game).  After answering a few questions and making clarifications, we told 
them we were ready to start the game. 
 We first played the game with each table (5 tables, 4 people per table was the usual 
format) having a herd size determined by drawing one of three knives from a sleeve that covered 
the blades.  A red blade knife meant a 6 TLU starting herd size, a blank one 8TLU, a black blade 
knife 10 TLU.  At each table, we usually had two people helping them with the game.  One 
served as a calculator / recorder, the other as a translator / explainer / chip collector and 
distributor.  One member of our team was at the center of the room making announcements 
about the game, and floated from table to table in the course of the each round checking math 
and answering questions while the other two worked at one of the tables as calculator/ recorders.  
To determine the covariate shock in each season, the person running the game walked around the 
room with the bag full of ping pong balls and had a different participant draw one ball from the 
bag.  For a complete game this seasonal draw happened ten times corresponding to 5 years.   
This first run through was rather quick, showing them how the game worked in the most basic 
form.   
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After this first run through, we introduced the idea of individual luck.  For this, we had a 
set of black bags, one for each table,  each bag having a white plastic soda cap with a happy face 
drawn in black (+10%), an even face drawn in blue (0%), or a sad face drawn in red (-10%).  We 
explained how the ball would be drawn, then we would adjust up or down by the value 
corresponding to the face to get their particular herd size change.  We said the faces were 
representing things like sickness, raids, wild animal attacks, and stressed that these were the 
kinds of things that lead to herd loss that insurance would not cover.  Only the draw of the ball 
from the bag could trigger insurance compensation.   
We then ran the game again, but this time with each person having his or her own starting 
herd size.  This variant of the game had random initial herd sizes, covariate shocks, and 
idiosyncratic shocks but no insurance.  The balls were drawn one after the other for each season 
and we recorded what happened.  We then took a lunch or a tea break depending on whether we 
started early or late, and came back again to illustrate how insurance works.  We took the values 
of the faces and balls that were drawn in the last game and showed them how they would have 
come out with mandatory insurance to the nearest TLU.   
We began by introducing the black chips and said they were like money.  You sold a 
goat, you got ten black chips; if you sold a goat for 1000 shillings, each chip was like a 100 
shilling note.
8
  If you wanted to insure a head of cattle, you had to pay one black chip to cover it 
with insurance for a season.  This worked most clearly if a set of white chips was laid out flat on 
the table and each one was covered in turn by a black chip that was scooped up and taken away.   
We then illustrated how insurance worked.  First we went through all the non-drought 
balls in turn, showing them that they would only pay at the start of such a season and nothing 
would come back to them.  It was only the two red drought balls that returned something, and 
                                                 
8
 100 shillings is around $1.30 with the exchange rate at $1=75 Ksh. 
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these did so in different ways.  The one that was half red, the 20% loss, would give them one 
goat in compensation for each head of cattle insured.  This was illustrated by taking a pile of ten 
white chips, covering them with ten black chips, drawing the half red drought ball, removing two 
of the white chips for losses during the drought, then bringing back 10 goats and sheep chips 
corresponding to the ten black chip payment.  These ten goats were then transformed into one 
white chip for a net loss of one white chip.  We did the similar illustration with the 30% all red 
drought ball, removing three white chips for the drought loss, bringing 20 goats and sheep, and 
turning them into two cattle for a net loss of one white chip.  In technical terms, we illustrated 
that the insurance compensation they could expect to receive at the end of a drought round was 
defined by: (predicted covariate mortality rate – 10%) × total insured livestock units. We stressed 
that the bad thing about insurance was that you don‟t grow as fast during good years since you 
have to keep selling goats to buy insurance and get nothing back from the insurance company in 
these years.  The good thing is that it brings you animals in the relatively rare instances that a 
drought occurs and you suffer losses.  We told them that insurance makes it so your herd size 
does not climb as high as you would go in the absence of insurance payments, but you don‟t fall 
as low with insurance as you would have without insurance.  We then went though how the 
covariate and the idiosyncratic could interact for losses, while the insurance was based on the 
covariate.  We illustrated the different outcomes that could occur with each of the two drought 
balls interacting with the three different kinds of bottlecaps that could be drawn. 
After making sure people had the basic idea, the enumerators at the tables took them 
through the calculations and changes to their herd size using the same starting herd size, 
covariate, and idiosyncratic shocks seen in the previous game.  We then showed each of them 
what had happened to their herd in the game with insurance compared to without insurance.  
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This was rather mechanical, but did give them a „with‟ and „without‟ comparison.  In almost all 
cases it showed you did not fall as far during the drought and ended up better off at the end of the 
game with insurance due to the combination of insurance payouts and herd growth being an 
increasing function of herd size.  In one case, in Dirib Gumbo, people ended up about the same 
with and without insurance.  This was used to illustrate another possible outcome, and came 
about because there was no drought until round 8 and it was a 20% drought, and the decreased 
herd growth in the first 7 rounds due to livestock sales to pay insurance was about the same size 
as the payout in the drought.  This was a good message and one we stressed in other places, but 
after that we got a bit trickier about making sure a drought hit in rounds 3-5 (sampling without 
replacement and having the drought balls on top of the other balls when people reached in to 
draw a ball).  We did make sure they understood it was possible that we could go all ten seasons 
with no drought happening so that you did not ever get a payment, but for demonstration 
purposes we attempted to make sure this did not happen in the demonstration of with and without 
insurance. 
After getting through this comparison, we usually took a lunch break or a second tea 
break, depending on the timing.  We came together for one final game.  The analysis presented 
below is of the pattern of play revealed in this final game. In this game, we explained that now 
they had to make a choice about the share of the herd that they would insure in each round, just 
as they would have to do with the real insurance.  If a player wanted to insure none, some, or all 
(to the nearest lower integer TLU value), that was up to each player.  We stressed that the payoff 
in a drought would be based on the number of TLU insured, not what the player had or lost if 
they did not buy full insurance.  We stressed that this would mean that if they did not insure or 
did not fully insure, they would not have to sell as many livestock over time to make insurance 
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payments, but they also would not get as any or as many back in a drought compared to someone 
who fully insured.  We noted that they had to make this insurance decision for each round; if you 
insured last round and did not insure this round and the drought came in this round, you would 
not be eligible for compensation.  Finally, we discussed this decision in the real world context 
that an insurance company based in Nairobi would really have no way of knowing how many 
animals a herd owner truly had, so this decision was like the one we will face in the real world – 
they stated the number they wanted to insure.  
  Before starting the game, the person running the game showed them pieces of paper with 
numbers 6-10 on them.  A player picked one of these papers and put it in the pocket of the 
person running the game.  We told them in this game, we would give everybody 100 shillings 
(around $1.30) at the end to thank them for playing the game.  However, you could win a cash 
bonus.  If you were above your starting period herd size at the end of the round in my pocket by 
less than 1 TLU, you won 20 more shillings.  If you were more than one but less than two TLU 
ahead, 40 shillings.  For each additional TLU, an additional 20 shillings was added.  After we 
had done this in a few places, we told them about the maximum and minimum kinds of payments 
we had been seeing in the other places.  The idea behind this was that a cash reward for game 
play might induce people to take the game more seriously than they would otherwise.  We then 
fielded any final questions and ran one final game.   
In this version, we did not tamper with the balls to make a drought happen.  In a few 
cases no drought happened.  After we finished up this game and calculated payoffs, we had a 
final discussion before breaking for the day.  Sometimes this was a longer discussion about how 
this would really work.  We told them we would be coming back with more information as time 
went by and we would work with them on the details.  Questions that came up were where one 
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could pay, would the payout be in cash or in livestock, whether you buy for the year or the 
season, if you get paid if you pay for many years but not the one with the drought, and what kind 
of payment range we expected.  We usually introduced our willingness to pay experiment to 
follow up on this work that would be going on in the next few days.  We usually stressed that 
this was a 3-5 year project that we were starting.  The donors were giving us money to both help 
develop the idea and to help extend the idea since it is a new concept.  We would be coming 
back to explain and work with them on the design and to ensure they understand the idea.  But 
our goal was to have this be something they could do to help themselves when we finished.  If 
we do our job right, there will be no need for donors to help on this in the future; this is 
something they can do to protect themselves against drought.  Sometimes we ended with a 
blessing or prayer, sometimes it was getting dark and people wanted to get home so we wrapped 
it up as fast as we could.  We would pack it all up and get ready to either move to the next town 
or run the show again in the same town on the following day.  The earliest we finished was 3:30 
in the afternoon, the latest was 6:30 in the evening. 
How they played the game:  
We played the game for two days in each of five locations with a total of 207 players. It 
was interesting as we played that people figured out pretty quickly how they could get pulled 
under the herd size threshold.  Once people got to about three animals, they started to make jokes 
about climbing on lorries and heading to Nairobi to become a watchman.  They knew that it was 
just a matter of time before they got washed out and the question became would they make it to 
the end of the game. There were lots of comments about how this game was a lot like their lives.  
That was both encouraging and also helped explain why they seemed to grasp it quickly whether 
they were school teachers, herders, nursing mothers, grandmothers, business persons etc.  
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Another notable characteristic of the days was how much laughing and joking around 
there was.  People got into it and though it was a long day with a complicated game, there was a 
lot of laughing and not all that much grumbling as the day went on towards night.  The good luck 
/ bad luck draws really got lots of reaction (to the extent that the -10% idiosyncratic red bottle 
cap went flying across the room after being thrown in a few cases).  They also had reactions like 
covering their eyes or flicking their hands at the person running the game to go away when he 
went around the room showing the red -30% drought ball had been drawn.  With regard to 
insurance, there was a sense that they knew it had to be more complicated than in our simple 
game (and they are right), but if something like this could come, it could be very helpful.  There 
were also frequent requests to keep coming back to explain insurance, since they were interested 
but really wanted to get more detail.  We told them that we were the researchers, not the 
insurance people, and that if they thought this was a good idea, go tell people that. If they think it 
is a bad idea, go tell people that too.  We want this to be something that people choose because 
they think it will help them, and that is why we have come with this idea. 
 Analysis of participants‟ insurance decisions in the final variant of the game where they 
decided what share of the herd to insure reveals several noteworthy results. First, looking at play 
across all ten rounds, 49% of subjects insured half or more of their herds in all ten rounds and 
12% insured the full value of their herds in all ten rounds.  
Table 2 summarizes the comparison between „with insurance‟ and „without insurance‟ in 
the final version of the game.  These results are generated by comparing actual play recorded in 
the game to a counterfactual that „shuts down‟ the insurance market in a spreadsheet. These 
results allowed us to demonstrate to participants that the main benefit of IBLI was that it reduced 
variability in herd size over time – particularly for relatively small herds near dynamic 
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thresholds.  The differences in mean herd size insured across the different starting herd sizes are 
statistically significant using t-tests. 
[Insert table 2 about here]. 
 
To further investigate insurance decisions, we estimate a tobit model with the fraction of 
the herd insured in a given round as the dependent variable (double-censored at 0% and 100%). 
The sample size in the regression is 1863, as we use lagged variables from the previous round in 
the regression to see if people react to past round outcomes. 
[Insert table 3 around here] 
 
The dynamic nature of the game is reflected in these results in a variety of ways. First, 
the share of the herd insured increases as more rounds were played.  We are not entirely sure 
why this may be.  It could be learning over time, or the fact that the payout round was announced 
in advance to be in rounds 6-10, or perhaps some other explanation.   
[insert figure 5 about here] 
Second, the dynamic structure of the experiment allows a nuanced understanding of the 
wealth dependent effects. On one hand, the coefficients for the initial herd size dummies 
illustrate that the higher the starting period herd size, the higher the share of the herd insured in 
subsequent rounds of the game. On the other hand, the beginning round herd size results indicate 
that the share of the herd insured is a decreasing function of herd size. Figure six presents 
simulated estimation results for the predicted share of the herd insured conditional on current 
round herd size.  The contrast between the two effects helps to explain the summary statistics in 
Table 2.  Subjects starting with 6 TLU insure a greater share of their herd on average not because 
of their starting point, but because they tend to have smaller herds across all rounds and share 
insured is inversely related to herd size. One interpretation of the shape of the curve is that 
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people have in mind some worst case post-drought herd size, so that as herd size increases, there 
is less concern about having too small a herd following a shock.   
[insert figure 6 about here] 
Finally, subjects tend to insure more of their herd immediately after experiencing a 
negative shock. While this makes sense in some psychological sense if the value of insurance is 
clearer after getting hit with a bad shock and seeing others around you compensated, it does 
suffer from closing the barn door after the horse has escaped logic.  Further adding to this puzzle, 
this response is both quantitatively and statistically stronger for the idiosyncratic shock even 
though insurance is explicitly linked to the covariate shock. In ongoing analysis, we will explore 
this effect further by linking the observed game play with a parallel contingent valuation study of 
individuals‟ willingness to pay for insurance and underlying risk preferences. 
[insert figure 7 about here] 
 
What comes next with the game?  
Currently we are experimenting with using laptops and local wireless networks to 
automate data entry and within game computations.  We need to find a way to make the game 
less labor intensive.  Last year, it required a team of three project members to lead the game, 
together with a team of seven to ten enumerators per day to play the game with 20-25 people per 
day.  This meant that we had to play the game two days in each village to reach 40 people per 
village.  We are trying to find a way to make us able to reach more people in a more time and 
cost effective manner. 
 We will be modifying this game to match more closely what the insurance companies 
will be offering as we get closer to the launch date.  We also will be extending this effort to sites 
we have not played the game in yet.  But we will maintain the core approach of using the game 
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to both extend the idea of insurance and to gather some information about how people are likely 
to use the product when it becomes available. 
Conclusions. 
 As a team, we felt this effort met with some success in the field as an extension tool.  
People did seem to understand the basic idea of the game, and seemed to enjoy playing it.  There 
has been a great deal of interest from people in the area where we played the game to know when 
we would be able to offer the real financial product it was designed to illustrate.  At this point, 
we are hoping for a January 2010 launch and are in the midst of playing the game in a different 
set of communities using the local network and laptop approach.   
 It was also beneficial to have the results of the game play to develop a new set of 
questions we can focus on in the follow up work we are currently planning.  A set of questions 
emerged that we plan on investigating: 
1) Why does the share insured increase as players play more rounds? 
2) What explanation would players give for the graph of the influence of herd size on 
insurance purchase? 
3) Why are there site differences? 
4) What explanation would players give for the reaction to the idiosyncratic shock we 
see in the estimation results? 
5) How will game play match up to risk tolerance and willingness to pay evidence 
gathered in a related study with these same herders? 
We intend to continue our work in this area for the next few years, with the overall goal 
of being able to offer to herders in these rangelands a financial instrument that they will be able 
to use to help manage risk.   Once we feel we have it working in the Marsabit area we have the 
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most experience with, we will look to expand to other arid and semi-arid rangelands where there 
is potential demand for this product. 
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Figure 1:  Standardized NDVI (1982-2008) for North Horr and Kargi 
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  Figure 2:  Mean and median herd size in TLU for the four Marsabit sites 2000-2002 
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Figure 3:  Reason cited for livestock mortality in the four Marsabit sites quarterly 2000-2002 
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Figure 4:  Expected Herd Growth reflecting Fixed Offtake 
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Figure 5:  Predicted share of herd insured by round of the game 
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Figure 6: Expected share of herd insured conditional on starting game herd size and round 
specific herd size (herd size on x-axis) 
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Figure 7:  Share of the herd insured in current round as a function of last round‟s shocks 
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Table 1:  PARIMA data on total income in four Marsabit District sites 
Milk Livestock Sale Slaughter Food aid Salary/ wage Cultivation Trade Gift 
44% 10% 4% 15% 14% 6% 4% 2% 
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Table 2: Contrasting outcomes with and without insurance in Kenya 
 Mean herd size 
‘with’ greater 
than ‘without’ 
Mean variance in herd 
size across rounds ‘with’ 
compared to ‘without’ 
Mean share of 
herd insured 
across rounds 
6 TLU start +3% -40% 81% 
8 TLU start +2% -29% 78% 
10 TLU start +3% -22% 68% 
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Table 3:  Double censored Tobit estimation of share of herd insured in each round of final game 
 
Coefficient 
(Standard Error) 
Round number 2-10 
 0.0123 *** 
(0.0046) 
Dirib Gumbo dummy 
 0.1081 *** 
(0.0378) 
Karare dummy 
 0.1285 *** 
(0.0346) 
Kargi dummy 
 0.1365 *** 
(0.0354) 
North Horr dummy 
 0.0906 *** 
(0.0365) 
Start 6 TLU dummy 
 1.2458 *** 
(0.0771) 
Start 8 TLU dummy 
 1.3811 *** 
(0.0938) 
Start 10 TLU dummy 
 1.3854 *** 
(0.1022) 
Herd size round start 
-0.0910 *** 
(0.0139) 
Herd size round start squared 
 0.0020 *** 
(0.0005) 
Covariate last round 
-0.0013 
(0.0009) 
Idiosyncratic last round 
-0.0028   * 
(0.0015) 
Sigma 
 0.4454 *** 
(0.0113) 
Decomposition fit 0.47 
N 1863 
Logologo is omitted site dummy, no constant included, two limit tobit estimation, pooled data (no control for 9 
rounds per player, 207 players) 
*** is significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, * at the 10% level 
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Endnotes 
 
